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I. Introduction
This article reviews the progress achieved in the liberalization of international trade in
banking services as part of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In par-
ticular, it examines the existing legally binding commitments and discusses the progress in
the negotiations at the Doha Round.'
The liberalization of trade in financial services is one aspect of the trend toward inter-
national economic and financial integration. The driving forces of global, regional, or bi-
lateral economic integration are two: first, economic and technological developments that
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facilitate the flow of goods, services, capital, and persons; second, the operation of political
forces that eliminate the remaining legal and institutional impediments to cross-border
transactions through either unilateral domestic reform or international legal agreements.
The concept of financial integration denotes the economic integration of financial markets
and activities: first, the elimination of legal obstacles obstructing cross-border flows of
capital, financial services, and financial institutions and, second, the economic and tech-
nological forces that facilitate cross-border financial activities, so that with respect to fi-
nance, there are no foreigners within the integrated area.2 The institutional component of
this process (i.e., the elimination of artificial legal barriers obstructing financial flows, ser-
vices, and institutions) is an essential but not sufficient condition of international financial
integration. The original rival of international economic integration was geography, not
legal and political institutions. The historical causes of fragmentation of national markets
were distance, expensive, and inefficient means of transportation and poor communications.
Legal and institutional obstacles became apparent only after rapid advances in information
technology, telecommunications, and transportation rendered the prospect of transnational
economic relations realistic.
There are four main tracks of institutional reform, not mutually exclusive, available to
those countries that elected to open their financial systems to international competition:
(1) the unilateral track, in which the abolition of legal barriers is the outcome of unilateral
domestic reform; (2) the bilateral track, in the case of a reciprocal agreement between two
countries to eliminate barriers with regard to bilateral trade; (3) the multilateral regional
track, in which a number of countries in the same region form a free trade area, abolishing
internal frontiers that obstruct the circulation of specified classes of goods, services, persons,
and capital transactions; and (4) the multilateral non-regional track of reform, in which the
free trade area aims to achieve a truly global coverage.3 In this respect, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) is the only global institution dealing with the rules of trade between
nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the
world's trading nations and ratified in their parliaments.
The paper is structured as follows. In section two, the question of tradability of banking
services is discussed and the four different modes of supplying banking services across
national borders are presented. The different types of barriers and obstacles to trade in
banking services are discussed in section three, and the various strategies to deal with them
are outlined in section four. In section five, a brief history of financial services negotiations
in the WTO is presented and the most important provisions of the GATS are discussed,
as well as their importance for trade in banking services. In section six, there is an overview
of the current state of play with regard to the liberalization commitments undertaken under
the GATS by the 148 WVTO members. An assessment of the state of play is presented in
2. See HAL SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND REGULATION, 1-2 (Foundation Press,
11 th ed. 2004); Ali M. EI-Agraa, General Introduction, in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE I (All M. El-
Agraa ed. 1997); Fritz Machlup, Economic Integration in INrENATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 119-20 (Miroslav N. Jovanovic ed. 1998).
3. See generally SYDNEY J. KEY, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE WTO (1997) [here-
inafter KEY, FINANCIAL SERVICES]; SYDNEYJ. KEY & HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL TRoE IN BANKING SERVICES:
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (1991); SYDNEY J. KEY, THE DoHA ROUND AND FINANCIAL SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS
(AEI Press 2003); GATS 2000: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION (Pierre Sauv6 & Robert
M. Stem eds., Brookings Insitution Press 2000) [hereinafter GATS 2000]; PIERRE SAUVi, TRADE RULES BEHIND
BORDERS: ESSAYS ON SERVICES, INVESTMENT AND THE NEW TRADE AGENDA (Cameron May 2003).
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section seven. In section eight, the key issues and the progress achieved so far in the current
Doha Round are discussed.
II. The Tradability of Banking Services
For financial institutions and the national economies in which they are headquartered,
financial activities with nonresidents are valuable sources of revenue and represent a dy-
namic and growing aspect of international trade in services. The notion of financial services
essentially refers to the full array of functions performed by financial institutions, including,
but not limited to, the acceptance of deposits, lending, payment services, securities trading,
asset management, financial advice, settlement, and clearing services. 4 In conducting these
activities with nonresidents, financial institutions engage in international trade in financial
services.'
Financial activities were not always regarded as tradable activities. With regard to insur-
ance, for example, the existing regulatory structure in the United States-where insurance
activities are largely subject to exclusive state regulation with very little oversight at the
federal level-is to a great extent attributable to the Supreme Court's opinion in Paul v.
Virginia that interstate insurance transactions are not transactions of commerce and trade
and, thus, not subject to the constitutional powers of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce by means of federal legislation. In the language of the Supreme Court in 1868,
contracts of insurance
are not articles of commerce in any proper meaning of the word. They are not subjects of
trade and barter offered in the market as something having an existence and value indepen-
dently of the parties to them. They are not commodities to be shipped or forwarded from one
State to another, and then put up for sale. They are like other personal contracts between
parties which are completed by their signature and the transfer of the consideration.
6
More recently, the winds of change in international economic relations have affirmed the
significance of financial services for international trade and the balance of national pay-
ments. As of the end of 2003, the value of international trade in financial services-either
by provision of services at a distance, by movement of the client, or by way of local estab-
lishment in the host country-amounted to nearly 4.5 percent of the total value of global
trade in commercial services ($1.7 trillion), or $80-85 billion.7 Furthermore, foreign direct
investment in banking in the form of branches, agencies, and subsidiaries, or by means of
cross-border mergers and acquisitions, increased dramatically between the early 1980s and
4. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex on Financial Services, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
5. See UNITED NATIONS, MANUAL ON STATISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 8-12 (2002); GATS,
supra note 4, at art. I; Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community and Certain
Related Acts, arts. 49-5 1, Dec. 12, 2002, 2002 OJ. (C 325) 54, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/
treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/ 12002 EEN.pdf [hereinafter EC Treaty].
6. Paulv. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868).
7. See generally Cross-Border Trade in Financial Services, Economics and Regulation, 75 FIN. MARKETS TRENDS 23
(Mar. 2000); World Trade Organization, Economic Research and Statistics Division, Measuring Trade in Services
(Nov. 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/statis-e/services-taining-module-e.pdfWORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, WoRLD TRADE REPORT 2004: EXPLORING THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE DOMESTIC POLICY
ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/
anrep-e/world-trade-report04e.pdf.
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the late 1990s. s Indicatively, the foreign share of local bank assets in low-income countries
increased from 19 percent in 1995 to 42 percent in 2000.9 In some countries of Central
and Eastern Europe and Latin America, financial assets under foreign control had reached
over 50 percent of total bank assets by 2000.10 On average, the share of assets controlled
by foreign-owned banks in thirteen major emerging markets rose by some 23 percentage
points between 1994 and 1999." The trend of foreign entry is primarily led by large fi-
nancial groups in the G-7 countries. U.S. banks, for example, now earn an estimated 15
percent of their income in cross-border activities, and this figure rises to 45 percent for the
five largest and internationally active banks.'I
Notwithstanding the upward trend, in absolute terms, foreign banks still find it difficult
to enter local financial markets, and when they do, they tend to concentrate on certain key
countries. In rich industrial countries, on average, the foreign share of local bank assets
remains at or below 10 percent, 3 and mergers and acquisitions of banks across borders are
still rather uncommon. 4 In emerging markets, a small group of rapidly growing countries
in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia account for almost the totality
of foreign bank entry," while a substantial number of low income countries host no foreign
banks.16 In most cases, these low income countries are the very countries that most des-
perately need the financial resources that foreign financial institutions can contribute to
local financial systems. By World Bank estimates, the banking systems of sixty poor coun-
tries, with a total population of 200 million people, are so tiny that the total banking assets
in each jurisdiction fall short of $1 billion'"-which is less than the total assets of Cambridge
Savings Bank, a small community bank in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
From a conceptual point of view, the 2002 Manual on Statistics on International Trade in
Services-a joint project of the United Nations, the European Commission, the Interna-
8. See generally COMMITTEE ON THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR OF EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 4 (Mar. 2004); Fariborz
Moshirian, International Investment in Financial Services, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 317 (2001); Stijn Claessens etal.,
How Does Foreign Entry Affect the Domestic Banking Market? 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 896 (2001); Allen N. Berger
et al., Globalization of Financial Institutions: Evidence from Cross-Border Banking Performance 23 (Brookings-
Wharton Papers on Financial Services, Working Papers Series Research Dep't 99-25, 2000), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2000/200004/200004pap.pdf; Claudia Buch & Gayle Delong, Cross-Border
Bank Mergers: What Lures the Rare Animal? (Kel Institute for World Economics, Working Paper No. 1070,
2001), available at http://www.uni-kiel.de/ifw/pub/kap/2001/kapIO70.pdf.
9. See Nihal Bayraktar & Yan Wang, Foreign Bank Entry, Performance of Domestic Banks and the Sequence of
Financial Liberalization 2 (World Bank Policy Research Discussion Paper 2004), available at http://www.cl.
psu.edu/sba/workingpapers/.
10. See OPEN DOORS: FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 19-27 (Rob-
ert E. Litan et al. eds., Brookings Inst. Press 2001) [hereinafter OPEN DOORS].
11. Id. at 114.
12. See Charles W. Calomiris & Robert E. Litan, Financial Regulation in a Global Marketplace, in BROOKINGS-
WHARTON PAPERS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 2000 283, 285 (Robert Litan & Antolny Santomero eds., 2001).
13. See Claessens et al., supra note 8; CLAUDIA M. BUCH, GLOBALIZATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: CAUSES OF
INCOMPLETE INTEGRATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC POLICY 46 (2003).
14. See Allen N. Berger & David C. Smith, Global Integration in the Banking Industry, FED. REs. BULL., Nov.
2003, at 451.
15. COMMITTEE ON THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 4-5.
16. See Stijn Claessens & Jong-Kun Lee, Foreign Banks in Low-Income Countires: Recent Developments and
Impacts, in GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 109 (James Hanson et al. eds., 2003).
17. See GERARD CAPRIo, FINANCE FOR GROWTH-POLICY CHOICES IN A VOLATILE WORLD 158 (2001).
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tional Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), the WTO, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
which sets out an internationally agreed upon framework for the compilation and reporting
of statistics on trade in services-has extended the definition of international trade in ser-
vices to include both services supplied between residents and non-residents as well as ser-
vices provided through foreign affiliates established abroad.s
For purposes of services trade negotiations and depending on the location of the supplier
and the recipient of services, one may therefore identify four modes of international trade
in banking services: (1) in providing the service, the financial institution remains outside
the territory of the consumer, and the consumer remains inside his territory of residence
(cross-border services); (2) in providing the service, the financial institution remains outside
the territory of the consumer, and the consumer moves outside the territory of his residence
(consumption abroad); (3) in providing the service, the financial institution establishes a
commercial presence in the territory of the consumer, and the consumer remains inside his
territory of residence (commercial presence); (4) the service is provided by natural persons
established in the territory of the consumer (presence of natural persons).' 9 The most im-
portant modes of trade in banking and other financial services are, by far, modes (1) and
(3) that, respectively, cover the cross-border provision of services and the establishment of
branches and other forms of commercial presence overseas.
IM. Examining the Barriers to International Trade in
Banking Services
Although physical barriers at the border and tariffs do not obstruct the flow of financial
capital across borders, a large number of national laws and regulations preclude or disturb
international financial integration. Legal impediments to international capital flows and
trade in financial services are classified as direct or indirect, depending on whether the
adverse effects of the pertinent rules on cross-border transactions are express and intentional
or indirect and inadvertent. 0
A. DIRECT BARRIERS
Direct (or discriminatory) measures draw an explicit distinction between resident and
nonresident financial institutions, investors or borrowers to the disadvantage of nonresi-
dents (overt discrimination), or result in disadvantageous treatment of nonresidents without
stating so explicitly (covert discrimination). In light of the three most common modes of
delivery of banking services across borders, institutional barriers may obstruct, discourage,
or prevent financial institutions from operating in another country, consumers from ac-
cessing financial services abroad, or services from being delivered at a distance without the
parties being simultaneously present. With regard to the specific aspect of the service to
which the discriminatory rule relates, discriminatory barriers may relate to the firm pro-
viding the service (e.g., a prohibition of entry in the local market), the customer receiving
the service (e.g., a requirement that local depositors may not deposit funds with foreign
18. See MANuAL ON STATISTICS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES, supra note 5.
19. See KE' & Scorr, supra note 3.
20. See generally id.; KEY, FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 3.; SAUvi, supra note 3.
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institutions or adverse tax rules which might have the same effect), or the cross-border flow
of capital upon which the service relies.
Historically, the most commonly used measures have been rules that obstruct or prohibit
the entry and operations of banks and other financial institutions in foreign markets by way
of local branches, agencies, and subsidiaries.2 Foreign entry in local markets can be re-
stricted by a rich assortment of administrative measures that aim to reduce or preclude the
number of foreign firms entering the national market or the ability of local customers to
access foreign financial institutions. At one extreme, direct barriers can take the form of
complete prohibition of cross-border financial linkages, flows of capital, or entry of foreign
financial institutions in the domestic market. In practice, less draconian forms of limitations
and operating restrictions on capital flows, market entry, and permissible activities of foreign
financial institutions are more common. A small sample would include prior official au-
thorizations for performing international capital transactions, limitations on the presence
of foreign financial institutions to a single city or region, and restrictions on the asset growth
or market share of foreign firms in domestic markets.22
It is also common to make foreign entry conditional on various limitations, for example,
on the permissible legal form of the local entity or its legal powers to engage in financial
activities. Restrictions on the total number of foreign firms that are permitted to operate
in the country as well as occasional and temporary moratoria or freezes on the issuance of
new regulatory licenses or charters are also common. When foreign entry takes the form
of equity investment in an existing local firm, local rules have often specified the maximum
percentage of equity that could be taken up by foreign investors. An equally effective means
of discrimination is introduced by national measures that restrict the ability of local resi-
dents to receive services from foreign banks and other financial institutions.
In addition to direct restrictions on foreign entry, the hostility of local authorities toward
foreign financial institutions may take the form of various operating restrictions that disturb
the operations of foreign institutions after initial entry to the market has been secured.
These measures have the effect of limiting the size of the domestic market available to
foreign firms either directly or indirectly, for example, by increasing the cost of their opera-
tions, limiting the number of branches that a foreign bank may establish, discouraging local
customers from doing business with them, or affording discriminatory benefits to domestic
competitors.23 Common practices include rules that directly limit the size of the market
available to foreign firms;24 rules that set maximum limits on the potential growth of foreign
21. See generally INGO WALTER, BARRIERS TO TRADE IN BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES (Thames Essay No.
41, 1985); Ingo Walter & H. Peter Gray, Protectionism and International Banking: Sectorial Effinency, Competitive
Structure and National Policy, 7 J. BANKING & FIN. 597 (1983); Sydney Key, Trade Liberalization and Prudential
Regulation: The International Framework for Financial Services, 75 INT'L AFFAIRS 61, 65-66 (1999); Meir Heth,
Towards International Free Trade in Banking Services, in RULES FOR FREE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 177-
206 (Daniel Friedman & Ernst-Joachim Mestmicker eds., 1990).
22. Heth, supra note 21; Walter, supra note 21; Walter & Gray, supra note 21.
23. See Walter, supra note 2 1, at 49-81.
24. These rules identify classes of clients who may or may not be served or define how the clients are to be
served, including: rules that limit the presence of the foreign bank to a certain number of branches or within
a single location; rules that mandate the submission of loans above certain limits to the scrutiny of the central
bank; rules that reserve particularly profitable activities for local or state-owned banks; and rules that preclude
foreign firms from doing business with retail customers, local authorities, or public enterprises.
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firms, either in absolute terms or by defining the maximum permissible market share;25
rules that increase the cost of funding of foreign firms by prohibiting the acceptance of
local deposits (prohibiting certain types of deposits or deposits from certain types of cus-
tomers); rules limiting the geographic range of foreign banks' local operations; nuisance
measures that are designed to increase the cost of doing business locally or compromise
the quality of financial services (e.g., limitations on acquiring real estate, limitations on staff
and management recruitment, exclusion from essential clearing and settlement networks,
and other forms of discriminatory treatment with regard to taxes, benefits, and subsidies
that augment the competitive advantage of domestic financial institutions).
B. INDIRECT BARRIERS: DIVERSITY OF REGULATORY TREATMENT AND THE COST OF DOING
BusINEss INTERNATIONALLY
The removal of all discriminatory regulatory barriers and the establishment of a level
playing field between domestic and foreign financial institutions do not necessarily lead to
full contestability and integration of international banking markets. With the substantial
decline of direct legal barriers during the 1980s and 1990s, a subtler and more elusive source
of legal restrictions has come to the forefront: the coexistence and conflict of diverse na-
tional laws and regulatory standards. In particular, it is argued that the diversity of national
regulatory structures and rules imposes substantial regulatory costs on international finan-
cial operations, thus obstructing the process of international financial integration. 6 The
concept of regulatory diversity refers to the coexistence of many national jurisdictions with
legal and regulatory systems that develop different laws, regulations, and practices to suit
diverse national and local preferences, objectives, and resources. Whatever its effects on
international economic relations, regulatory diversity is the inevitable outcome of the right
of sovereign jurisdictions to self-government and rulemaking autonomy.
Diversity is a universal and inherent quality in our lives. Given that different individuals
and groups have different preferences, experiences, and objectives, legal diversity across
different nations is inevitable and desirable. Legal rules constitute essential instruments of
political and economic organization. They ought to adapt and cater to local preferences,
needs, resources, and objectives. Different nations seldom hold identical views concerning
the content of their laws. In his celebrated political treatise The Spirit of Laws, the French
philosopher Charles de Montesquieu identified the inevitable diversity of national laws that
"should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are framed that it should
be a great chance if those of one nation suit another."27 Another Frenchman, Voltaire, did
not quite agree. He lamented the fragmentation of the international legal order portraying
the evils of legal diversity (and implicitly the virtues of legal harmonization) in the following
terms: "Is it not an absurd and terrible thing that what is true in one village is false in
25. For example, special gearing ratios, reserve requirements, and capitalization limits may be set at different
levels for foreign banks in order to constrain their market share.
26. See, e.g., Sco-rr BRADFORD & ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE FAR ENOUGH? THE COSTS
OF FRAGMENTED MARKETS (2004); Miles Kahler, Trade and Domestic Differences, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 298, 299 (Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore eds., Cornell Univ. Press 1996); Alan Sykes,
The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International Goods and Services Markets, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L.
49 (1999) [hereinafter Sykes, The (Limited) Role]; Albert Breton & Pierre Salmon, External Effects of Domestic
Regulations: Comparing Internal and International Barriers to Trade, 21 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 135 (2001).
27. CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, BOOK 1, CHAPTER 3, 30 (Prometheus Books 2002).
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another? What kind of barbarism is it that citizens must live under different laws? When
you travel in this kingdom you change legal systems as often as you change horses." 8
The classic argument that regulatory diversity obstructs international economic integra-
tion is rather simple: regulatory differences across countries can increase the cost of trans-
actions consummated and firms operating across national boundaries.2 9 More specifically,
the legal and regulatory framework can potentially increase the costs for nonresident firms
engaging in cross-border economic activities more than it increases costs for resident firms
inside the regulating jurisdiction, thus conferring a competitive advantage on domestic firms
against their foreign competitors or merely rendering international activities costly and
unappealing30 The collateral effects of legal and regulatory diversity and heterogeneity are
diffused and indirect because the cause of incomplete integration is not the discriminatory
treatment of non-resident financial institutions, but the very coexistence of heterogeneous
domestic legal and regulatory institutions across national boundaries.
The structure and diversity of the international legal and regulatory system raises the
economic cost of virtually all types of international economic transactions but remains
particularly relevant for international banking and finance: financial activities are subject to
extensive, complex, and often cumulative regulatory structures relating to systemic safety
and soundness, consumer and investor protection, privacy, market integrity, and corporate
governance, to name just a few. Since the sheer scope of the spectrum of regulations af-
fecting financial institutions and markets increases the odds of regulatory diversity across
nations, international financial activities appear to be particularly vulnerable to this partic-
ular type of transaction cost.
Obviously this is neither new nor extraordinary. Internationally, active financial institu-
tions, investors, and borrowers have always been subject to foreign laws and regulatory
procedures. What makes the current experience remarkable is not so much regulatory di-
versity per se, but the acute tension between, on the one hand, the unprecedented oppor-
tunities afforded by the technological and commercial forces of economic globalization and,
on the other hand, the less accommodating reality of an international legal order that still
comprises hundreds of sovereign sources of law. It is the economic and technological ca-
pacity to fully integrate national markets perhaps for the first time in history that places
the remaining asymmetries or imperfections into a whole new perspective.'
A fair summary of the economic burden posed by legal and regulatory diversity in a world
of international transactions and conflicting domestic regulations would include informa-
tion costs, uncertainty, duplication, and lost economies of scale. First, internationally active
28. VOLTAIRE, OEUVRES DE VOLTAIRE VIE, at Dialogues (1838). Credit for unearthing this quotation belongs
to Professor Philip R. Wood. See PHILIP R. WOOD, MAPS OF WORLD FINAcIAL LAw 4 (2005).
29. See Sykes, The (Limited) Role, supra note 26; Paul Brenton, What Are the Limits to Economic Integration?
5-6 (Center for European Policy Studies, Working Document No. 177, 2001).
30. See Alan Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 3 (1999)
[hereinafter Sykes, Regulatoryl; Alan Sykes, Exploring the Need for International Harmonization: Domestic Regu-
lation, Sovereignty and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A Pessimistic iew, 3 CH. J. INT'L L. 353, 354 (2002)
[hereinafter Sykes, Eploring the Need].
31. See Maarten Smeets, Glohalisation and the Trade Policy Response, 24 J. WORLD TEE 56, 64-68 (1990);
Hanah Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance, 42 VA.J. INT'L. L. 931, 931-77 (2002);
Sol Picciotto, The Regulatory Crsis-Crss: Interaction between Jurisdictions and the Construction of Global Regulatory
Networks, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION (Bratton et al. eds., 1996); Horatia
Muir Watt, Experiences from Europe: Legal Diversity and the Internal Market, 39 TEx. INT'L L. J. 429 (2004).
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banks incur significant expenses and loss of time in their attempt to gather and evaluate
information about foreign laws and practices. Furthermore, they often incur so-called sur-
prise costs when new rules are adopted in foreign markets, over which local firms have been
consulted and therefore gained competitive advantage.3 Even more worrisome, domestic
legal reform may result in seemingly non-discriminatory rules that are nevertheless fully
adapted to the structure and traditional operations of local firms but pose significant com-
pliance challenges for incoming foreign institutions."
Second, the co-existence of many national sources of law and regulation may cause un-
certainty as to the circumstances that trigger the application of foreign laws and the in-
volvement of national supervisory authorities, law enforcement agencies, and courts.14 The
provision of financial services across borders, increasingly via electronic networks, often
stretch the traditional link between the reach of prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction
and the boundaries of territorial sovereignty." Because of the intangible nature of banking
services and advances in financial technology, banks providing services to international cli-
ents are not required to be in physical proximity to the territory of their clients. In the
absence of strong territorial nexus, the application and enforcement of domestic regulatory
standards by the authorities of the host country are likely to depend on unilateral policy
considerations that tend to vary among nations.3 6 In the domain of economic regulation,
different countries may hold different views on what the subject-matter of regulation and
how long the arm of domestic regulation and supervision should be. Hence, it is often
difficult to tell if an international operation will trigger the application of foreign laws.
There is now empirical evidence suggesting that uncertainty as to the circumstances that
trigger the application of foreign rules and regulatory standards increases transaction costs
and may potentially discourage international financial operations. 7
Another significant barrier raised by regulatory diversity in a fragmented international
legal order is the cumulative application of multiple, inconsistent, or plainly different na-
tional rules and regulatory procedures. The most characteristic obstacles in that group are
domestic rules in the form of licensing procedures that regulate the entry of foreign insti-
32. See Sykes, The (Limited) Role, supra note 26.
33. See Sykes, Regulatory, supra note 30; Sykes, Exploring the Need, supra note 30.
34. See, e.g., Jurgen Basedow, Conflicts ofEconomic Regulation, 42 AM. J. COMp. L. 423 (1994); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regu-
lation, 50 Bus. LAw. 447, 482 (1995); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON JURISDICTION AND
APPLICABLE LAW IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (June 6, 2001), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/
statements-nles/statements/2001/urisdiction-and-applicable-law.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2005); Stephen
Choi, Assessing Regulatory Responses to Securities Market Globalization, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 613,641-
43(2001).
35. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 31; Picciotto, supra note 31.
36. See Andreas Lowenfeld, Public Law in the InternationalArena: Conflict of Laws, International Law, and Some
Suggestions for their Interaction, in RECUEIL DES CoURs: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAw 321 (1980); Jurgen Basedow, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, Tbeoretiscber ersuch iiber die Odnung-
spolitischen Normen des Forumstaates, 52 RABELsZ 8 (1988).
37. See INCOMPLETE EUROPEAN MARKET FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES (Paolo Cecchini et al. eds., 2003); ECONOMIC
& FINANCIAL COMMITTEE, REPORT ON EU FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 16-22 (2002); Martin Schiller and Friedrich
Heinemann, How Integrated Are the European Retail Financial Markets? A Cointegration Analysis 5 (Center for
European Research, Discussion Paper No. 02-22, 2003), availableatftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0222.pdf
(last visited Oct. 14, 2005); Ahi Mitrani, Regulating E-Commerce, E-Contracts and the Controversy of Multiple
Jurisdiction, 7(2) INT'L TRADE L. & REG. 50, 50-51 (2001); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SURVEY ON
JURISDICTIONAL CERTAINTY FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (2001).
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tutions in the local market. While the right of domestic firms to engage in financial activities
is subject to obtaining prior regulatory authorization once, their overseas competitors must
overcome the competitive disadvantage of securing compliance with two licensing proce-
dures, one in the home and one in the host country, prior to acquiring the right to serve
local clients. Furthermore, having complied with multiple sets of regulatory standards, in-
ternationally active financial institutions are subject to the distinct, but equally disturbing
process, of proving so to each one of the seized authorities through duplicate reports, audits,
and similar mechanisms.
An even more disturbing situation arises where, as a result of the operation of conflict of
laws or extra-territorial jurisdiction, two sets of incompatible national rules are applied to
a single set of facts, for example, the regulation of the bank's structure of corporate gov-
ernance simultaneously by the home country and the country where cross-border activities
are taking place. In this case, in the event of incompatibility of two sets of applicable stan-
dards, compliance with one set of rules is necessarily a violation of the other, rendering the
pertinent activities impossible. In most cases, the overseas operations of financial institutions
are subject to a single system of law in the country where the operations are conducted.
For example, the branch of a U.S. bank in Athens offering banking services to local residents
operates almost exclusively under Greek law. In this case, the bank is subject to a single set
of rules that apply equally to domestic financial institutions. The problem here is the need
to adapt the services, corporate literature, market conduct, trading practices, or advertising
information to the requirements of each national market that the bank intends to enter.
This requirement destroys the economies of scale that an integrated financial market prom-
ises to deliver."s The disturbance is particularly annoying if the underlying legal differences
are not so much caused by subjective differences in political objectives and regulatory in-
terests as by pure chance or lack of information about better alternatives, particularly in
the small print of the legal framework.
IV. How to Facilitate International Trade in Banking
Services: The Political Economy of International
Financial Integration
All available models of financial integration entail some degree of coordination and co-
operation among participating countries, but, otherwise, there are many types of structural
reforms towards financial integration: international agreements that prohibit discriminatory
national measures; supranational institutions that produce total, partial, or minimum har-
monization of national rules and centralization of supervisory and enforcement functions;
mutual recognition of national standards and practices and home country regulatory con-
trol; in contractual matters, harmonization of conflict of laws and freedom of choice of
applicable law; and an infinite number of hybrid solutions, including the current imperfect
model of mutual recognition with residual host country powers.
A. THE NEGATIVE FORM OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
In the negative form of economic integration, participating countries undertake legal
obligations to eliminate direct legal barriers and measures that discriminate against non-
38. See THE COMMITTEE OF THE WISE MEN (LAMFALUSSY COMMITTEE), FINAL REPORT ON THE REGULATION
OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS 10 (2001).
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resident financial institutions, issuers, and investors. To achieve this purpose, international
legal commitments of economic integration routinely refer to restrictive measures that
participating countries shall abolish or shall not adopt." Legal instruments addressing these
explicit barriers constitute forms of negative economic integration because they do not set
de novo rules and standards regulating the activities in question, but rather limit themselves
to prohibiting national rules that restrict international financial activities.40 The liberalizing
force of negative integration relies on the enforceability of the legal commitments under-
taken by participating countries. When sovereign jurisdictions commit themselves to abol-
ishing restrictions on market access as well as regulations discriminating against foreign
financial institutions, the credibility of the liberalization exercise relies on the ability of
affected market actors or other sovereign states to enforce these legal commitments through
a judicial process based on the rule of law.
Legal commitments to eliminate direct barriers to international financial transactions
may ensure the parity of overseas financial institutions vis-a-vis domestic competitors
through a wide concept of non-discrimination. But even if non-discriminatory national
measures are eliminated, there is a certain point beyond which the normative effects of
negative legal covenants cannot reach. Negative integration is a de-regulatory mechanism.
Once the most troubling law-based restrictions have been dismanded, it becomes increas-
ingly problematic to fit the remainder of obstacles within the scope of negative commit-
ments of non-discrimination and market access. The less visible obstacles posed by regu-
latory diversity and other structural barriers relate to the existence and application of more
than one set of rules as a problem in itself rather than the placement of undue burdens on
the incoming bank as compared to domestic competitors. This uncertainty marks the
boundaries of legal commitments prohibiting discriminatory treatment as methods of fi-
nancial liberalization. A different approach is needed beyond this point.
B. THE POSITIVE FORM OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
The negative form of economic integration is often unsuitable to remedy the twin effects
of regulatory diversity, namely high regulatory costs and competitive inequality. By defi-
nition, only the coordination, harmonization, or convergence of national regulatory policies
and standards would constitute an effective remedial response. The process of international
legal convergence and harmonization invariably requires voluntary constraints on national
39. "No Party may adopt any measure restricting any type of cross-border trade in financial services by
cross-border financial service providers of another Party ... ." North American Free Trade Agreement, art.
1404(1), Dec. 17. 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]. "[R]estrictions on the freedom of establishment
of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited." EC Treaty, supra
note 5, at art. 43. "[A]lI restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and betweenMember
States and third countries shall be prohibited." EC Treaty, supra note 5, at art. 56. On the concept of negative
integration see J. Pelikmans, The Institutional Economics of European Integration, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW:
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAl. EXPERIENCE 318, 318-21 (Cappelletti et al, eds., 1986).
40. The term negative refers solely to the legal effects of the integration commitment. It is conceivable that
instruments of negative integration are set out in positive language, mandating rather than prohibiting certain
measures. "Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords
to its own investors ... ." NAFTA, supra note 39, at art. 1405 (emphasis added). This does not change the
effect of the rule as prohibiting discriminatory national measures rather than setting substantive regulatory
requirements.
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regulatory autonomy and a certain transfer of lawmaking power from the national arena to
a supranational body, organization, or even more complex lawmaking institutions. It is, in
other words, a process of positive integration in that that the coordination of domestic
regulatory institutions at the international level aims to replace different national standards
with common international rules or allocate regulatory responsibility among interested
countries in some other way in view of reducing the regulatory burden of doing business
internationally.
1. Legal Harmonization as an Instrument of Economic Integration
The pursuit of international legal and regulatory harmonization by international insti-
tutions, sovereign states, or networks of cooperating national authorities constitutes a sig-
nificant policy instrument towards the elimination of indirect legal barriers that disturb
regional or global economic and financial integration.4' The notion of international legal
and regulatory convergence or harmonization refers to the process by which national laws
and regulatory standards become increasingly similar, comparable, or at least equivalent.
42
Conceptually, the strong form of regulatory harmonization results in complete and ab-
solute uniformity of national standards. At a lower level of uniformity, regulatory harmo-
nization may conceivably generate a broad array of outcomes ranging from the basic ap-
proximation of national legal systems (which may share similar general principles and
objectives but differ in detail) to the substantial convergence of national rules, regulatory
practices, and standards relating to them.
43
2. Mutual Recognition as an Instrument of Economic Integration
Another policy towards international economic integration is mutual recognition. Mutual
recognition refers to the agreement between sovereign states whereby they agree to the
transfer of regulatory authority from the host country where a transaction takes place to
the home country from which a product, person, service, or firm originate.44 It reflects the
general principle that if a service can be provided lawfully in one jurisdiction, it can circulate
in any other participating country without having to comply with the laws of these other
jurisdictions.
The term mutual denotes the parity and reciprocity of the undertaken obligations. The
recognition is of the equivalence, similarity, compatibility, or, at least, acceptability of an-
other state's regulatory framework and represents the scope, rationae materiae, and scale of
the reciprocal obligations. The equivalence of national norms is conceptually static because
it reflects a fact and a situation that exists, whereas the recognition is conceptually normative
41. See Pier Jan Slot, Harmonisation, 21 E.L.R. 378, 378-381 (1996); Daniel Vignes, The Harmonization of
National Legislation and the EEC, 15 E.L. REv. 358, 358-61 (1990); Sykes, The (Limited) Role, supra note 26, at
50.
42. See Marc Angel, From the Unification of Law to its Harmonization, 51 TUtL. L. REv. 108 (1976-1977);Jaroslav
G. Polach, Harmonization of Laws in Western Europe, 8 Am. J. COmp. L. 148 (1959); Rene David, The Methods
of Unification, 16 Am. J. ComP. L. 13 (1968-1969).
43. See Martin Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of Laws, 39 A. J. Comp. L. 699 (1991); Sandeep
Gopalan, New Trends in the Making ofInternational Commercial Law 23 J.L. & CoM. 117 (2004); David Leebron,
Claims for Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework, 27 CAN. Bus. LJ. 63, 66 (1996).
44. See Kalypso Nicolaidis, Mutual Recognition of Regulatory Regimes: Some Lessons and Prospects, in REGULATORY
REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET OPENNESS, 171 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment ed., 1996).
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and dynamic because it mandates a certain action and leads to a new arrangement between
participating Member States. Member States take stock of the equivalence and convergence
of national regulatory frameworks, evaluate and accept the remaining differences, and un-
dertake reciprocal obligations to open up national borders to banks and services originating
in the mutual recognition area.
Mutual recognition is a hybrid of negative and positive integration. It goes beyond the
mere elimination of barriers in that it pursues liberalization through the equivalence of
national regulatory perspectives and the measured and safe allocation of regulatory respon-
sibility. In parallel, it is not a typical model of positive integration in that the replacement
of national rules by common standards is not strictly required. It is an instrument of regu-
lation because the division of responsibility among participating jurisdictions has a clear
normative element; it is also a means of deregulation because a disturbing layer of national
control is abolished. Ideally, services lawfully provided in one jurisdiction may freely cir-
culate across national borders. Hence, mutual recognition secures market openness and
promotes the values of trade liberalization by reducing structural barriers while simulta-
neously avoiding the excessive policy and transaction costs of full harmonization and uni-
formity. It thereby preserves local regulatory choices and preferences and stimulates po-
tentially healthy regulatory competition.
The model of mutual recognition presupposes that participating countries are satisfied
that the legal and institutional framework of their fellow participants is equivalent to their
own standards of regulation and supervision. The principle of equivalence of national stan-
dards as a necessary precondition of mutual recognition reflects the inextricable connection
and reciprocity between the liberalization and the regulatory perspectives of international
finance. Uncoordinated and unconditional mutual recognition puts into question the very
rationale of national regulatory policy and produces high policy costs in the form of deep
compromise of national regulatory perspectives. Hence, it must be resisted and dismissed
out of hand as a perilous concession of market access and an implausible waiver of local
control and sovereignty vis-a-vis firms and services, towards which the essential trust and
confidence are lacking.
Given the diverse national views on what constitutes a market failure and how this should
be corrected, the model of uncoordinated mutual recognition leads to the situation in which
services lawfully provided in the country of origin may upset public policy objectives in the
country of destination and produce effects that are unacceptable for the host jurisdiction.
In the absence of equivalence, sovereign states are likely to regard the respective regulatory
framework of fellow states as being of poor quality and low economic efficiency, too liberal
and insufficient to meet their own standards of social protection, fairness, and financial
stability, or both. And there is of course the traditional argument of the "race to the bottom"
that renders the political acceptance of uncoordinated mutual recognition extremely un-
promising regardless of whether the risk of regulatory laxity is fanciful or real. As long as
the risk is perceived to be real, it suffices to destroy political consensus regardless of whether
it actually is a real risk.
Thus, to create the necessary equivalence in the substantive rules of different legal sys-
tems as a basis of mutual recognition, a coordinated process of legal harmonization is nor-
mally required. Harmonization purports to bring about consonance or accord in the legal
institutions of participating countries, in other words, to reduce the disturbances caused by
legal plurality and diversity. Legal harmonization is a dynamic process in that it changes
the status quo and induces a new legal environment into being. Equivalence is a descriptive
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concept and denotes an existing state of affairs whereby legal institutions are corresponding
or virtually identical in value, effect, or fiuction. In any case, the correlation between mutual
recognition and the establishment of common rules is strong and the policy of minimum
harmonization (as opposed to total uniformity) as basis for mutual recognition sound.
V. Trade in Banking Services and Multilateral Negotiations
in the WTO
The GATS-the most significant product of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations-
is, in terms of coverage, the most far-reaching among the international legal instruments
that regulate the terms of trade in services among nations. The 1997 Financial Services
Agreement and the specific national commitments on financial services operate against the
legal and institutional framework established by the GATS. The agreement on trade in
services reached in the Uruguay Round is perhaps the most important single development
in the multilateral trading system since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade itself
came into effect in 1948.
The GATS itself, in the preamble to the official text, makes reference to the three un-
derlying ideas that shaped the negotiation and formulation of the final text: first, the estab-
lishment of a multilateral framework of principles and rules, in the form of the GATS,
aimed at progressively opening up trade in services, contributing to economic development
worldwide; second, WTO members, particularly developing countries, would still have to
regulate the supply of services to meet national policy objectives; and third, it should be a
key objective of the international trade regime to help developing countries take a fuller
part in world trade in services, particularly through strengthening the capacity, efficiency
and competitiveness of their own domestic services.45
A. THE HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AGREEMENT
At the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1993, negotiations on financial services
remained largely unfinished.- Some specific commitments to provide market access and
national treatment were made in the sector, but most developed countries with an interest
in open financial markets did not consider them sufficient to conclude the negotiations. As
most countries did not make adequate commitments, the risk was that they would never-
theless benefit from other nations' liberalization commitments under the normative impact
of the most-favored-nation principle. Hence, the Second Annex on Financial Services to
the GATS and the Decision on Financial Services adopted at the end of the Round provided
for the continuation of extended negotiations in this sector.47 The negotiations on financial
services were expected to continue for a six-month period following the entry into force of
the remaining texts comprising the GATS (i.e., until the end of June 1995). 41 It was envis-
aged that, upon conclusion of these negotiations, participating countries could improve,
modify, or even withdraw all or part of their commitments.49
45. See GATS, supra note 4, pmbl.
46. World Trade Organization, Financial Services: The results of the financial services negotiations under
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/finance-e/
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The 1995 negotiations were actually concluded on July 28, 1995, instead of June 30, as
initially planned."0 The agreement is known as the interim agreement, since negotiators
again decided that the results of the negotiations were not satisfactory and envisaged further
negotiations for a period of two years. As a result of the 1995 negotiations, twenty-nine
WTO Members (counting the European Union (EU) as one) improved their schedules of
specific liberalization commitments.5 ' "Those improved commitments were annexed to the
Second Protocol to the GATS." 2 Three other countries-Colombia, Mauritius, and the
United States-decided not to improve their commitments and took broad exemptions
from the most favored nation clause based on reciprocity. "As a result of those extended
negotiations, and with new accessions to the WTO, [ninety-seven] Members of the WTO
(counting the EU) individually) had commitments in financial services by mid-1997 in the
area of financial services, compared to some [seventy-six] countries at the end of the
Round." 3 The Second Protocol and the commitments annexed to it entered into force on
September 1, 1996.14
The new round of financial services negotiations was launched in April 1997. "Members
again had an opportunity to improve, modify or withdraw their commitments in financial
services and to take MFN exemptions""5 from the MFN principle (MFN exemptions) in
the sector from November 1 until December 12, 1997. As a result, a new and improved set
of commitments in financial services under the GATS was agreed to on December 12, 1997.
"A total of [fifty-six] schedules of commitments representing [seventy] WTO Member gov-
ernments and [sixteen] lists of MFN exemptions.., were annexed to the Fifth Protocol to
the GATS, which was open for ratification and acceptance by Members until [January 29,
1999]."16 Fifty-two Member governments accepted the Protocol by the due date, and those
Members decided to put the Protocol into force on March 1, 1999.17
"With five countries making commitments in financial services for the first time, the total
number of WTO Members with commitments in financial services increased to 104 upon
the entry into force of the Fifth Protocol."" As a result of the negotiations, the United
States, India, and Thailand decided to withdraw their broad MFN exemptions based on
reciprocity. The new commitments contained, inter alia, "significant improvements allow-
ing commercial presence of foreign financial service suppliers by eliminating or relaxing
limitations on foreign ownership of local financial institutions, limitations on the juridical
form of commercial presence (branches, subsidiaries, agencies, representative offices, etc.),
and limitations on the expansion of existing operations."" 9
B. BANKINc SERVICES IN THE GATS
With regard to international trade in banking services, the institutional framework and
national commitments established under the GATS, in general, and the 1997 Financial
50. Id.; see Second Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, June 24, 1995, 33 I.L.M. 99
(1996).
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Services Agreement, in particular, largely define the current state of play. To understand
the methodology and normative impact of this framework, there are no less than seven
legal instruments to consider: (1) the GATS, which is a general framework agreement
governing the liberalization of the entire services economy, including banking and financial
services; (2) the GATS Annex on Article II Exemptions that determines the circumstances
under which nations may depart from the overarching MFN principle; (3) the GATS Annex
on Financial Services that contains important provisions regarding trade in financial services
and often exempts financial services from the general provisions of the GATS; (4) the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services entered into by financially developed
countries to undertake liberalization commitments that in many important respects exceed
the degree of liberalization achieved under the general 1997 Financial Services Agreement;
(5) the Schedules of Specific Commitments and Lists of Article II Exemptions that contain
the specific commitments undertaken by individual countries in different sectors, modes of
supply, and specific types of service; (6) the Second Protocol to the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, also known as the Interim Agreement; and (7) the Fifth Protocol to the
GATS, the so-called Financial Services Agreement that incorporates the commitments cur-
rently in force in the field of banking and financial services.
C. INTRODUCING THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE GATS
Generally, the 1997 Financial Services Agreement and the specific national commitments
on trade in banking services operate against the legal and institutional framework estab-
lished by the GATS.
This framework consists of a central set of rules, the core text of the General Agreement
on Trade in Services, a number of ancillary legal texts, which are either annexed to the
Agreement or informally agreed upon by the national representatives such as the so-called
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. It shall not be presumed that the
texts annexed to the main Agreement are of lesser importance. In fact, the substantive
normative impact of the GATS and its effectiveness as an instrument of trade liberalization
relies on the breadth and depth of the liberalization commitments tabled by national rep-
resentatives, which are take the form of Schedules of National Commitments annexed to
the body of the Agreement.
Generally, the GATS covers all measures taken by Members affecting trade in services
and all service sectors. The Agreement is unusual in taking a wide view of what constitutes
trade, and defines trade in services as the supply of a service through any of four modes.
Certain GATS obligations are of general application in all sectors of the services econ-
omy, while others depend on the sector-specific commitments assumed by individual Mem-
bers. The first overarching obligation relevant for all types of services is the principle of
transparency that requires that each Member publish promptly "all relevant measures of
general application" 60 affecting trade in services. The second overarching legal commitment
is the MFN principle that prevents Members from discriminating among their trading
partners. The Agreement, however, permits Members to list temporary exemptions to
MFN.
The liberalizing effects of the GATS depend on the extent and nature of sector-specific
commitments assumed by individual Members. A member's obligations-even in such fun-
60. GATS, supra note 4, at art. ElI.
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damental respects as treating a foreign supplier of services on the same basis as a national
supplier-depend largely on the specific commitments it has undertaken in its national
schedule. The core provisions of the GATS in this context relate to market access (article
XVI) and national treatment (article XVII). These provisions apply only to sectors explicitly
included by a Member in its schedule of commitments and are subject to the limitations
that a Member has scheduled. This was a crucial choice of institutional design that reveals
one of the major structural weaknesses of the GATS regime for financial services.
Rather than agreeing to a general commitment of market access and national treatment
unless an exception is specifically stated in the national Schedule, it was decided that Mem-
ber States must specifically list the sector and type of service that they want to commit, the
nature of the commitment, and any applicable exemptions. The problem with this approach
is that it is impossible to tell the scope and scale of financial services liberalization in a given
country by reading the GATS and the relevant national schedule. For example, the Sched-
ules reveal the commitments that a country has decided to make in banking services but do
not reveal the applicable restrictions if a country has decided to remain unbound with regard
to a given service or sector. The Schedules disclose the sectors and modes of supply that a
nation has decided to open to international competition but reveal nothing about the reg-
ulatory restrictions awaiting foreign firms in sectors and modes of supply that no commit-
ment has been undertaken.
In addition to tolerating legal uncertainty as to the applicable regulatory framework, this
positive list approach posed significant challenges for national delegations negotiating the
commitments. While it is relatively easy to make a blanket commitment of full liberalization
and then carve out specific regulatory limitations in certain areas of overarching national
concern, it has proven to be particularly challenging to scan through the entire body of
national law for economic sectors and regulatory domains where no particular objection to
liberalization exists. As Kenneth W, Dam, a prominent negotiator and insider, put it:
"[a]lthough one can argue conceptually that in a perfect world there would be not difference
in substance between the negative and positive list approaches, adoption of the positive list
approach in fact doomed the negotiations to a trivial result."6
D. THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE
The GATS framework applies to financial services. A financial service is any service of a
financial nature offered by a financial service supplier of a Member.62 Financial services
include all insurance and insurance-related services, and all banking and other financial
services (excluding insurance). A financial service supplier means any natural or juridical
person of a Member wishing to supply or supplying financial services. 63 The notion of
banking services includes the following activities: acceptance of deposits and other repayable
funds from the public; lending of all types; financial leasing; all payment and money trans-
mission services, including credit, charge, and debit cards, travelers checks, and bankers
drafts; guarantees and commitments; provision and transfer of financial information, and
financial data processing and related software by suppliers of other financial services; ad-
61. See KENNETH W DAM, THE RULES OF THE GLOBAL GAME: A NEw LOOK AT U.S. INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC
POLICYMAKING 123 (The University of Chicago Press 2001).
62. GATS, supra note 4, Annex on Financial Services.
63. Id.
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visory, intermediation, and other auxiliary financial services on all the activities listed in this
list, including credit reference and analysis, investment and portfolio research and advice,
advice on acquisitions and on corporate restructuring and strategy.64 Whether the GATS
applies therefore depends on the nature of the service, not the type of financial intermediary
involved. All types of financial intermediaries enjoy identical rights under the GATS, pro-
vided that they engage in the same types of activities.
E. THE FOUR MODES OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN BANKING SERVICES
The GATS framework applies to four modes of delivery of banking services in accordance
with the structure illustrated in Chart one. First, cross-border services (mode one)-the
bank is not present in the territory of the importing state and the service is delivered within
the territory of the importing state.6 Note that the criterion for trade in mode one is the
location of the bank outside the territory of the importing state and the delivery of the
service within that territory. Hence, defining the place where the service is delivered is a
crucial criterion for the distinction between mode one and mode two. Given that the lo-
cation where the service is provided is not clear in many cases of cross-border banking
services, for example in the case of electronic finance, the distinction between modes one
and two is particularly problematic and constitutes one of the open technical questions of
the current financial services negotiations in Doha.
The second mode of supply under the GATS is consumption abroad (mode two)-the
bank is not present within the territory of the importing state and the service is delivered
to the consumer outside the territory of the consumer's residence. 6 The definition of mode
two is consistent with the definition of mode one, whereby the location of the delivery of
the service and not the physical movement of the customer is the crucial criterion. Although
it is often believed that mode two refers to services provided to consumers traveling abroad,
in fact the relevant criterion is not the movement of the consumer but the place of the
delivery of the service.
The third mode of supply is commercial presence (mode three)-the bank is commer-
cially present within the territory of the importing state, and the service is delivered
therein.67 The notion of commercial presence covers a variety of investment vehicles, rep-
resentative offices (legal entities of the home country), branches (legal entities of the home
country), subsidiaries (legal entities of the host country over which the bank has direct or
indirect control), associates (legal entities of the host country over which the bank holds a
minority interest), and correspondents. Foreign bank entry can take one of two forms: entry
via a branch or subsidiary and entry via the purchase of an existing franchise. Banks such
as Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, and Deutsche Bank usually follow the first strategy, while
ABN AMRO, Commerzbank, ant HSBC tend to purchase existing franchises. 68 Finally, the
fourth mode of supply is temporary movement of persons (mode four)-the bank is com-
mercially present within the territory of importing state and the service is delivered within
64. Id.
65. GATS, supra note 4, at art. I(2)(d).
66. GATS, supra note 4, at art. I(2)(b).
67. GATS, supra note 4, at art. I(2)(c).
68. See generally Michael Pomerleano & George J.Vojta, Foreign Banks in Emerging Markets: An Institutional
Study, in OPEN DooRs, supra note 10.
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Chart 1: Modes of Trade in Banking Services under the GATS Framework
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the territory of importing state through nationals of the exporting state. 69 Mode four today
accounts for less than 2 percent of the total value of services trade.70 Present commitments
refer almost exclusively to high-level personnel. More than 40 percent of mode four com-
mitments are for intra-corporate transferees whose mobility is intimately related to foreign
direct investment; another 50 percent of commitments cover executives, managers and
specialists, and business visitors."
69. GATS, supra note 4, at art. I(2)(d).
70. See Workd Trade Developments in 2004 and Propectsfor 2005, in INrrEINAToNA. TRADE STATISTICS 2005
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F. TRADE IN BANKING SERVICES AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS
International trade in financial services and international financial flows are related but
distinct concepts. Some activities involve both trade in financial services and cross-border
financial flows simultaneously. For example, a bank lending money to nonresidents engages
in international trade in financial services and performs an international transfer of capital.
This is not always the case, as the following table illustrates.
Table 1: Trade in Banking Services and International Capital Flows
Loan by foreign Loan by foreign
Loan by domestic supplier on a supplier established
supplier cross-border basis in the country
Loan 1. Neither financial 3. Financial services trade 5. Financial services trade
Involves services trade nor interna- only (e.g., a nonresident plus forward direct
Domestic tional capital flow (e.g., a bank lends to a resident investment (e.g., a
Capital Only resident bank lends to a who travels abroad. The nonresident bank estab-
resident using local funds stay in the lishes a branch locally
capital) country of the bank) and lends money by
using funds borrowed
locally)
Loan 2. International capital 4. Financial services trade 6. Financial services trade
Involves flow only (e.g. a resident and international capital plus inward direct
Foreign bank lends to a resident flow (e.g. a nonresident investment and interna-
Capital Only using funds that the bank lends to a resident tional capital flow
bank borrowed abroad) by transferring the related to the supply of
funds locally) the loan
If a resident bank provides a loan to a resident using domestic capital (cell 1), this creates
neither international trade in financial services nor an international capital transaction. If a
resident bank borrows from abroad and provides a loan to a resident (cell 2), this creates
an international flow of capital but there is still no international trade as between the bank
and the client. Conversely, when a resident travels abroad and borrows from a nonresident
bank in foreign currency and the funds stay in the country where the bank is located (cell
3), the transaction creates trade in financial services (consumption abroad) but does not
entail an international capital transaction. This will only happen in situations that fall within
the scope of cells four and six.72 Moreover, the physical entry of financial institutions in
foreign markets constitutes a significant form of international trade in financial services but
does not necessarily involve cross-border flows of capital other than the original investment
in setting up the branch or subsidiary (cell 5).
72. See Masamichi Kono & Ludger Schukhnecht, Financial Services Trade, Capital Flows, and Financial Stability
(World Trade Orgganization Working Paper ERAD-98-12, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
res.e/reser.e/pera9812.doc; Natalia T. Tamirisa, Trade in Financial Services and Capital Movements, 24J. FIN.
SERVS. RES. 47 (2003); Masamichi Kono & Ludger Schuknecht, How Does Financial Services Trade Affect Capital
Flows and Financial Stability?, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES: ISSUES AND LESSONS FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 139-175 (Stijn Claessens & Marion Jansen eds., 2000) [hereinafter INTERNATIONALI-
ZATION].
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It therefore turns out that full capital mobility and trade in financial services constitute
closely associated but conceptually separate perspectives of international financial integra-
tion. For policy purposes, the distinction implies that the elimination of barriers to inter-
national trade in financial services, either on a cross-border basis or through the entry of
foreign institutions in local markers, does not strictly require the liberalization of financial
flows between residents and nonresidents and vice versa. In substance, however, trade in
financial services in an international order of tight capital controls is too costly and unap-
pealing. A meaningful process of international financial integration should no doubt attack
on both fronts-although the political reality may dictate otherwise.
Article XI of the GATS takes into account the relevance of capital flows for the provision
of some services and seeks to ensure that capital restrictions are not used to reverse liber-
alization commitments in cases where the flow of capital is necessary for trading in services.
Article XI of the CATS affirms that the CATS does not affect the rights and obligations
of the members of the IMF under the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, including the
use of exchange actions that are in conformity with the Articles of Agreement. Nevertheless,
Members shall not impose restrictions "on any capital transactions inconsistently with their
specific services commitments regarding such transactions."73
G. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF LIBERALIZATION COMMITMENTS: MEASURES AFFECTING THE
SUPPLY OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
An important question relates to the subject-matter of the CATS financial services frame-
work. Put simply, what sort of laws, rules and regulations are subject to liberalization com-
mitments on market access, non-discrimination, regulatory transparency and so forth?
According to article I of the CATS, the agreement applies to "measures by Members
affecting trade in services." 4 Measures by Members means measures taken by central, re-
gional, or local governments and authorities, as well as those taken by non-governmental
bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by central, regional or local governments or
authorities. The WTO Panel on EC-Bananas III defined the scope of application of the
CATS in the following terms: "The scope of the CATS encompasses any measure of a
Member to the extent it affects the supply of a service regardless of whether such measure
directly governs the supply of a service or whether it regulates other matters but neverthe-
less affects trade in services.""5
The Appellate Body upheld this finding and held that "[t]he use of the term 'affecting'
reflects the intent of the drafters to give a broad reach to the CATS. The ordinary meaning
of the word 'affecting' implies a measure that has 'an effect on', which indicates a broad
scope of application."7 6 In accordance with the foregoing definition, the liberalization com-
mitments undertaken in the WTO cover all measures taken by governments or regulatory
authorities provided that, first, there is trade in banking services and, second, the measures
affect such trade.
73. See GATS, supra note 4, at art. XI.
74. Id. at art. I.
75. Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas III,
1 7.285, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997).
76. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Ba-
nanas III, 20, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
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H. DISCUSSING THE NORMATIVE IMPACT OF THE GATS: THE PRINCIPLES OF
MOST-FAVORED NATION, NATIONAL TREATMENT, AND MARKET ACCESS
The purpose of the GATS is the removal of barriers to trade in services through a process
of negative integration. The framework specifies measures that nations must eliminate or
refrain from taking. The process is de-regulatory in that it involves the elimination or
reduction of trade barriers. There is no process of positive integration that would result in
the transfer of law-making and standard-setting powers from nation states to the VVTO
level. The second underlying idea, which is a stark reminder of the limitations of the GATS
as a mechanism of negative integration, is the express carve-out of prudential matters from
the normative effect of the financial services commitments. Whatever the implications of
national regulation on international trade, there is no provision in the GATS preventing
national authorities from taking measures to ensure the integrity and stability of the finan-
cial system or for prudential reasons, including the protection of investors, depositors,
policy holders, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier.
1. The Principle of Most-Favored Nation
One of the most significant principles of the GATS is the MFN rule. According to article
I of the GATS, in adopting measures affecting trade in banking services each country "shall
accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Mem-
ber treatment no less favourable that that it accords to like services and service suppliers of
any other country."77
The motto of the GATS is "favor one, favor all." Members cannot afford privileges to
services or firms originating in other countries without affording the same treatment to all
other members. MFN means treating one's trading partners equally on the principle of
non-discrimination. Under GATS, if a country allows foreign competition in a sector, equal
opportunities in that sector should be given to service providers from all other WTO
members.
The legal commitment of MFN raises a number of interpretative difficulties. The first
difficulty is whether the concept of like services and services suppliers is given a narrow or
wide scope. Suppose that Country X has no objections to foreign banks establishing
branches within its domestic territory, provided that the country of origin of the foreign
bank never applied to the IMF for financial assistance in the past. The rule discriminates
between banks from different countries on the basis of their nationality. But is a bank from
Group A (countries which never applied for IMF assistance) like a bank from group B
(countries which applied for IMF assistance)? One view is that a bank is like any other bank,
and, therefore, the measure breaches the MFN clause. But a narrower view of the MFN
provision would be that banks from countries with weak financial systems are not like banks
from countries with strong financial systems-assuming programs of financial adjustment
administered by the IMF are indications of a country's financial weakness. Hence, the
measure falls outside the scope of article I. The wider the definition of like services, the
more measures will fall within the scope of the MFN clause, with potential benefits for
international trade.
The issue has now been resolved. A bank from Group A is like a bank from Group B
regardless of the quality of the financial systems in the two groups. Under V87TO law, the
77. See GATS, supra note 4, at art. Hl.
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notion of like services is a wide one-to the extent that the service suppliers concerned
supply the same services, they should be considered like for the purposes of article 11. T
A second difficulty relates to the definition of the notion of "treatment no less favorable."
Is it limited to de jure discrimination, or is it extended to de facto discrimination as well?
The answer is that article II prohibits both de jure and de facto discrimination against
services and firms originating in different WTO Members.79
Regarding the permissible exemptions from the obligations under article H of the GATS,
the Annex on article II exemptions is clear. First, WTO Members may negotiate and sched-
ule exemptions from MFN to the benefit of specific WTO Members. Second, the principle
of MFN does not apply to regional agreements of trade integration. Provided that the
conditions of article V are met, WTO Members may enter into bilateral or multilateral
trade agreements that would otherwise breach the MFN principle.
The principle of MFN is an interesting rule of trade liberalization. On certain conditions
its impact could be substantial but in itself it is hardly a method of trade liberalization. A
WTO Member is perfectly capable of respecting the MFN rule even in the absence of
liberalization commitments, provided that it treated all foreign firms similarly. Indeed, a
country may be completely isolated from international markets and still comply with the
MFN rule provided that no foreign country received trading privileges. The principle of
MFN has liberalizing effects only when it is complemented by affirmative commitments of
trade liberalization, primarily commitments of market access and equal national treatment.
2. The Principle of Market Access
Market access is one of the fundamental concepts of the GATS framework and signifies
the commitments of WTO Members to open up their borders to trade in services, including
banking services. The Agreement does not define the concept of market access, but there
is little doubt that the concept refers to the ability of exporting firms to provide services in
one of the four modes of trade in services. In contrast with the MFN principle, the GATS
does not contain an overarching rule prohibiting restrictions on market access. Instead, it
was a major choice of institutional design that WTO Members must expressly list the types
of services and the modes of supply that are subject to a market access commitment, as well
as any restrictions to market access that apply in the relevant types of services and modes
of supply.
Provided that a market access commitment is in place with regard to a given type of
service (e.g., acceptance of deposits) and a mode of supply (e.g., modes 1, 2, and 3), article
XVI of the GATS contains an exhaustive list of measures that a member shall not maintain
or adopt: (1) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of numerical
quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers, or the requirements of an economic needs
test; (2) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of nu-
merical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test; (3) limitations on the total
number of service operations or on the total quantity of service output expressed in terms
of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the requirement of an economic
needs test; (4) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in
a particular service sector or that a service supplier may employ and who are necessary for,
78. Panel Report, Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automative Industry, 10.248, WT/DS142/12
(Oct. 4, 2000).
79. Appellate Body Report, supra note 76, 231-23.
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and directly related to, the supply of a specific service in the form of numerical quotas or
the requirement of an economic needs test; (5) measures that restrict or require specific
types of legal entity or joint venture through which a service supplier may supply a ser-
vice; and (6) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum per-
centage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign
investment.80
The list of market access restrictions that a WTO Member cannot maintain or adopt
has no effect unless the WTO Member schedules a specific market access commitment
with regard to a given type of service and mode of supply. When the commitment is in
place, the measures enumerated in the list cannot be maintained or adopted unless the
member schedules a specific limitation. Specific commitments on market access effectively
preclude or eliminate discriminatory barriers. The common denominator of the limitations
enumerated in the list of article XVI is that they preclude, restrict, or otherwise impede
access to the market of the WTO Member employing the limitation.
Under the scheme established by the GATS, a WTO Member grants full market access
in a given sector and mode of supply when it does not maintain in that sector and mode
any of the types of measures listed in article XVI. The measures listed comprise four types
of quantitative restrictions (items (1)-(4)), as well as limitations on forms of legal entity
(item (5)) and on foreign equity participation (item (6)). The list is exhaustive.
3. The Principle of National Treatment
The close-ended list of market access limitations does not exhaust the pool of potential
discriminatory measures against foreign financial institutions. There is a potentially open-
ended list of measures that are designed for, or simply result in, less favorable treatment of
foreign banks vis-a-vis their domestic competitors. The national treatment rules of the
GATS framework are designed to eliminate or reduce this long list of discriminatory pro-
visions. Again, the prohibition of discriminatory treatment does not apply automatically.
WTO Members must schedule specific types of services and modes of supply that will be
subject to the national treatment requirement. For these types of services and modes of
supply, in which specific commitments have been scheduled, article XVII of the Agreement
requires each WTO Member to accord to services and service suppliers of any other Mem-
ber, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment "no less favorable"
than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers."'
A WNTO Member grants full national treatment in a given sector and mode of supply
when it accords in that sector and mode conditions of competition no less favorable to
services or service suppliers of other Members than those accorded to its own like services
and service suppliers. The national treatment standard does not require formally identical
treatment of domestic and foreign suppliers: formally different measures can result in ef-
fective equality of treatment; just as formally identical measures can in some cases result in
less favorable treatment of foreign suppliers (de facto discrimination). Thus, it should be
borne in mind that limitations on national treatment cover cases of both de facto and de
jure discrimination. Of course, the institutional design of the Schedules of specific com-
mitments permits WTO Members to retain the right to discriminate between identical
80. See GATS, supra note 4, at art. XVI.
81. See GATS, supra note 4, at art. XVII.
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services supplied through different modes by not guaranteeing national treatment with
respect to each mode.
The policy of national treatment may raise difficulties and destroy reciprocity to the
extent that rules and regulatory practices are different in different jurisdictions. Reciprocal
national treatment obligations necessarily result in some sort of advantage for financial
institutions originating in countries with complex and more restrictive regulatory structures
when they operate in markets with less strict regulatory regimes. This is a structural prob-
lem of competitive equality that is caused by differences in national rules rather than the
principle of national treatment. Eliminating structural barriers will always involve some
sort of regulatory coordination or even the harmonization of laws and covenants of mutual
recognition of regulatory standards and supervisory practices.
I. THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
Against the background and general framework of financial services commitments un-
dertaken under the 1997 Financial Services Agreement, a smaller group of WTO Members
(predominantly developed OECD countries) reached a consensus to go beyond the pro-
visions of the 1997 Agreement and the minimum rules established by GATS pursuant to a
more liberal approach under the so-called Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services. 2
The countries participating in the Understanding agreed (1) that their residents can go
abroad and purchase all types of banking and financial services; (2) to extend national treat-
ment and MFN status to non-resident financial institutions as regards the purchase of
financial services by public entities in their jurisdictions; (3) to extend national treatment
to non-resident financial institutions with regard to provision and transfer of financial in-
formation and financial data processing and advisory and other auxiliary services, excluding
intermediation, relating to banking and other financial services; (4) to extend full market
access to an enterprise with commercial presence in their territories that would automati-
cally cover new financial services that may be developed in the future; (5) to extend national
treatment with regard to access to payment and clearing systems, participation in, or access
to, any self-regulatory body, securities or futures exchange or market, clearing agency, or
any other organization or association; (6) to extend entry rights to skilled workers, senior
managers, and other professionals working for commercial present foreign financial insti-
tutions; and (7) to endeavor to remove or limit the effects of non-discriminatory measures
that prevent incoming firms from offering permitted services, measures that impose geo-
graphic restrictions, measures that impose on incoming securities firms the full banking
regulatory framework, and other measures that affect adversely the ability of incoming firms
to operate, compete, or enter the WTO Member's domestic market.8 3 This is an interesting
provision aimed at solving the crucial issue of prudential regulatory measures that, despite
their non-discriminatory character, raised regulatory hurdles for incoming foreign firms.
The use of the term "endeavor" must no doubt mean that the enforceability of this com-
mitment is rather limited, if at all existent.
82. WTO, Understanding on Committee of Financial Services, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/
21-fin-e.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
83. Id.
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J. DOMESTIC REGULATION IN THE GATS
The institutional prominence of regulatory harmonization as an instrument of interna-
tional financial integration diminishes dramatically outside single European market. In the
framework of the WTO, the GATS does very little to address the trade effects of non-
discriminatory domestic regulations in general. With regard to financial services in partic-
ular, it explicitly exempts non-discriminatory measures pertaining to financial stability,
monetary policy, and investor protection from its main disciplines, which in any case fall
short from demanding common national regulations. Other regional economic areas with
significant financial market components, such as the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, and the Southern Common Market,
are equally reluctant to address the integration costs of regulatory diversity by way of formal
harmonization instruments.8 4
With particular regard to financial services, the insulation of domestic regulatory auton-
omy from the formal disciplines of the international trade regime is almost complete. Article
2 of the GATS Annex on Financial Services contains a crucial provision for the institutional
reconciliation of the rival values of regulation and financial services liberalization. In dealing
with the political dynamics of the negotiation process, GATS negotiators had to address
the reluctance of national financial supervisory authorities to implicate domestic institutions
of prudential supervision in the legal process of WTO-sponsored liberalization. They felt
that there were probably enough multilateral international institutions and standard-setting
bodies with a mandate to discuss the international financial regulatory and supervisory
framework. On the other hand, the subject-matter of the GATS commitments was suffi-
ciently broad to turn any domestic rule into potential GATS material. To the extent that a
large number of more or less well-intentioned and non-discriminatory regulatory provisions
are capable of having collateral trade effects, financial services commitments could con-
ceivably have important ramifications for the exercise of regulatory and supervisory over-
sight by national authorities. For that reason, the national delegations were not prepared
to mess with the complex and delicate issue of institutional and organizational structure of
their regulatory and supervisory systems. As a result, in the GATS framework, the rivalry
between regulation and liberalization was settled in favor of the regulatory status quo.
Under article 2 of the GATS Annex on Financial Services a Member "shall not be prevented
from taking measures for prudential reasons," including for the protection of investors,
depositors, policy holders, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service
supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.85 Provided that the
regulatory measures apply similarly to domestic and overseas financial institutions, they are
immune to the disciplines imposed by the GATS. As soon as this prudential carve-out was
agreed, the financial regulators who were present in the negotiations and were previously
84. See NAFTA, supra note 39, at art. 1410; ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, ASEAN FRAME-
WORK AGREEMENT ON SERVICES, available at http://www.aseansec.org/6628.htm; Thomas C. Fischer, A Com-
mentary on Regional Institutions in the Pacific Rim: Do APEC and ASEAN Still Matter?, 13 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L
L. 337 (2003); Ramkishen S. Rajan & Rahul Sen, Liberalisation of Financial Services in Southeast Asia under the
ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, 18 J. INrT'L BANKING L. & REG. 132 (2003); Gabriel Gari, Free Cir-
culation of Services in Mercosur: A Pending Task, 10 L. & Bus. REV. Am. 545 (2004); Eva Holz, MERCOSUR:
Lessons from the Recent Past-The Case of the Financial Services, 10 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 299 (2004).
85. See GATS, supra note 4, at art. H.
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agonizing over the implications of the new framework on their regulatory discretion packed
their stuff and went home.
The prudential carve-out permits a WTO Member to take measures to ensure the in-
tegrity and stability of the financial system or for the protection of investors, depositors,
policy holders, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier,
regardless of other provisions of the Agreement. But these powers cannot be used as a
means of avoiding the Member's commitments or obligations under the Agreement where
domestic measures do not accord with the fundamental principles of MFN, national treat-
ment, and market access. Schematically, if a measure is taken for genuine prudential reasons,
the measure is not caught by the GATS commitments unless the measure breaches one of
the fundamental GATS disciplines. For example, if it treats foreign banks less favorably
than domestic ones. If that were the case, the prudential carve-out would not suffice to
rescue the national measure in question. In these cases, the appropriate course of action for
interested national authorities is to negotiate an express limitation in the national list of
national treatment and market access commitments.
In short, the effects of financial liberalization in the WTO are much softer than the
European approach towards regulatory diversity and the structural trade barriers generated
by prudential regulatory standards. Nevertheless, a certain level of discipline on the direc-
tion, content, and procedure of non-discriminatory national regulations is not altogether
absent from the GATS. First, there is the requirement of transparency. Each Member shall
publish promptly and, except in emergency situations, at the latest by the time of their entry
into force, all relevant measures of general application that pertain to or affect the operation
of this Agreement, including international agreements pertaining to or affecting trade in
services.86 Further, in sectors where specific commitments are undertaken, each Member
shall ensure that all measures of general application affecting trade in services are admin-
istered in a reasonable, objective, and impartial manner.8 7 Moreover, the Working Party on
Domestic Regulations was established to draft disciplines relating to technical standards,
licensing, and qualification requirements for all services sectors. So far it has produced no
meaningful results with regard to financial services. Finally, it will be recalled that the Ve7TO
Members that scheduled their commitments according to the Understanding on Commit-
ments in Financial Services committed themselves to endeavor to remove or limit the effects
of non-discriminatory measures which prevent incoming firms from offering permitted
services, imposing geographic restrictions, imposing on incoming securities firms the full
banking regulatory framework, and generally affecting adversely the ability of incoming
firms to operate, compete, or enter the host jurisdiction.
In principle, the removal of structural barriers to trade-which are caused by differences
in national rules and the overlapping or consecutive application of many layers of regulation
and supervision, consumer protection rules, accounting standards, and so forth in different
V7TO Members-requires coherent strategies of positive integration. Other policies that
could adjust domestic regulations to the needs of international trade include requirements
of necessity and proportionality in regulating commercial activities (enforced in the EU but
not in the GATS); requirements of due process in the administration of laws and regulations,
such as prior consultation with domestic and foreign firms before the enactment of regu-
86. See id. at art. Il.
87. Id. at art. VI.
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latory reforms; predictability in standard-setting and enforcement; objective criteria in the
exercise of supervisory control; transparency of regulatory objectives; and other principles
of good regulatory practice.8
VI. The Current State of Play: A Study of Remaining
Barriers and National Commitments
The current state of play is the outcome of the 1997 Financial Services Agreement as
supplemented by subsequent commitments scheduled by countries that joined the VWTO
since December 1997. It should be noted at the outset that there are currently 148 WTO
Members but forty countries have declined to make commitments in relation to banking
services. 9 This does not necessarily mean that trade in banking services with residents of
these jurisdictions is impossible. National Schedules of Specific Commitments contain posi-
tive commitments of market access and national treatment. In the absence of positive com-
mitments, the actual practices of the jurisdiction in question may or may not preclude
international trade in services. In practice, by not scheduling liberalization commitments,
WTO Members remain unbound and retain their sovereign powers and discretion as to
how to treat foreign financial institutions.
A. MFN COMMITMENTS
MFN commitments are by far the most far-reaching with regard to trade in banking
services. Since the principle of MFN is automatically applicable unless a specific exemption
has been scheduled (in contrast with the positive list approach of market access and national
treatment), it is perhaps unsurprising that all but eight WTO Members have accepted the
principle of MFN with regard to financial services.
B. MARKET ACCESS AND NATIONAL TREATMENT
There are many types of commitments of market access and national treatment in the
national schedules of WTO Members. Different countries have scheduled different com-
mitments and limitations depending on the mode of supply, type of banking service, and
nature of liberalization commitment. It is impossible to discuss individual nations' com-
mitments one by one, but a few general observations are in order.
Including the twenty-five EU Member States, thirty-seven countries have scheduled fi-
nancial services commitments in accordance with the provisions of the Understanding on
88. See generally Geza Feketekuty, Regulatory Reform and Trade Liberalization in Services, in GATS 2000, supra
note 3.
89. Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Fiji, Bangladesh, Rwanda, FYR Macedonia, Bar-
bados, Niger, Grenada, Belize, Myanmar, Guatemala, Botswana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Brunei, Darussalam,
Moldova, Madagascar, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Togo, Burundi, Mali, Tanzania, Cameroon, Maldives, Cam-
bodia, St Lucia, Central African Republic, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Chad, Suriname, Congo, Swaziland,
DR of Congo, Trinidad and Tobago, Djibouti, Uganda, Dominica, and Zambia. The best compilation of the
thousands of pages of national legal commitments is DAVID HARTRIDGE ET AL., HANDBOOK OF GATS COMMIT-
MENTS: TRADE IN SERVICES UNDER THE WTO (2003). The Schedules and the remainder of official texts com-
prising the GATS can also be found electronically at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-home.asp?language =
l&-= 1.
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Commitments in Financial Services. 90 These are primarily (but not exclusively) OECD
countries with the most advanced and competitive financial systems. Furthermore, it should
be noted that on average high and medium income countries scheduled the most advanced
commitments, and most other income groups scheduled commitments commensurate with
the level of their financial sector development. 9'
With a few exceptions (e.g., Malaysia and Mexico), the scheduled commitments of im-
portant emerging market economies offered little new market access to foreign financial
institutions. In fact, most countries either scheduled already existing practices (Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand) or, even worse, scheduled
less than what they were already practicing. The Philippines, for example, committed to
permit foreign equity participation in domestic banks up to a limit of 51 percent when the
actual domestic rule is more generous, allowing foreign equity participation up to a limit
of 60 percent. 92 The same can be said of OECD countries that had already opened their
markets to a substantial degree and thus opted for using the GATS framework to bind the
existing status quo.
Some WTO Members (e.g., Malaysia, Brazil, Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, Pakistan,
Philippines, and Thailand) were reluctant to schedule liberalization commitments that went
as far as the regulatory status quo because they wanted to retain the discretion to adjust the
regulatory environment in the future. On the other hand, they wanted to assure the foreign
firms already operating in the market that any future changes would not affect their opera-
tions. Hence, when scheduled commitments are tighter than the applicable rules, they are
often supplemented by footnotes or references that clarify the scope of application of the
commitments with regard to existing financial institutions.
Besides the thirty-seven financially developed nations that adopted the Understanding
on Commitments in Financial Services, the most extensive commitments to liberalization
were made by small economies in Africa, the Pacific, and Latin and Central America
(Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands,
Guyana, Haiti, and Panama). Furthermore, commitments to liberalize the commercial pres-
ence of foreign financial institutions by way of branches or subsidiaries (mode three) were
far deeper and more extensive than commitments to liberalize cross-border banking at a
distance (mode one). In fact, extending the scale and scope of banking services commitments
for mode one is one of the priorities of the current round of negotiations. For example,
with regard to cross-border services (mode one) and among countries in Latin and Central
America, only Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti, and Panama included commitments in their sched-
ules. In other words, none of the region's large emerging markets tabled commitments.
Among countries in Asia and the Pacific the situation was similar, with only Indonesia and
Malaysia of the larger emerging financial markets tabling mode one commitments. With
regard to mode three commitments, countries in Asia and the Pacific (e.g. India, Indonesia,
Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand) are
more likely to schedule limitations on the commercial presence or equity participation of
90. Australia, Norway, Canada, Sri Lanka, EU Members, Switzerland, Iceland, TurkeyJapan, United States,
Liechtenstein, New Zealand, and Nigeria. See id.
91. See generally Ying Qian, Financial Services Liberalization and CATS-Analysis of the Commitments under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) at the World Trade Organization (WTO), in INTERNATiONALIZA-
TION, supra note 72.
92. Id.
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foreign financial institutions than countries in Latin and Central America, where only Brazil
and the Dominican Republic were largely reluctant to afford unlimited market access to
foreign financial institutions.
There is some consensus among academic and political observers that the financial ser-
vices agreement was useful in binding existing regulatory and trade practices but achieved
little actual liberalization beyond that point. 93 The modesty of the success is often attributed
to the sectoral nature of the negotiations that limited the opportunities for inter-sectoral
concessions. Put simply, the negotiations were carried on by finance ministries rather than
trade officials, which hindered the scope for bargaining trade commitments across different
sectors. Developing countries were less than enthusiastic about services negotiations be-
cause they reasonably suspected that their own services firms would gain very little from
international market liberalization. To the extent that they were prepared to negotiate, the
only meaningful way would have been through hard bargaining across different sectors in
the hope that their agreement on financial services liberalization would be matched by other
countries' reciprocal agreements in other services sectors and crucially in the goods and
commodities markets where developing countries enjoyed a comparative advantage. By
insulating financial services negotiations from the remainder of trade negotiations, the
structure of the GATS framework generated a strong defensive attitude among developing
countries that was eventually reflected in the modest results of the national schedules of
commitments.
C. REMAINING LIMITATIONS ON MARKET AccEss AND NATIONAL TREATMENT
The positive list approach of the national schedules of commitments makes it impossible
to assess the actual degree of liberalization of individual countries. A substantial number of
countries have scheduled fewer and less extensive liberalization commitments than the com-
petitive opportunities that they actually afford to foreign financial institutions. The absence
of commitments in the multilateral GATS framework does not necessarily imply the exis-
tence of extensive barriers in the domestic legal environment. One of the structural differ-
ences of the positive list approach is that policy makers, financial institutions, and academics
must still examine the domestic regulatory standards of each jurisdiction to determine po-
tential barriers to trade. The GATS national schedules of commitments do not tell the
whole story.
For the following information on remaining discriminatory barriers to trade in banking
services several sources were relied on, including the 2004 National Trade Estimate Report
on Foreign Trade Barriers of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative," the 1998 Na-
tional Treatment Study of the U.S. Department of Treasury,9 the Trade Policy Reviews of
individual WTO members (conducted by WTO specialists), 96 the Market Access Database
93. See Dam, smpra note 61, at 127; WENDY DOBSON & PIERREJACQUET, FINANCIAL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION
IN THE WTO 90 (Institute for International Economics 1998).
94. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REFPRESENTATIVE, 2004 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE
BARRIERS, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Reports-Publications/2004/2004-National-
Trade- Estimate/2004_NTEReport/SectionIndex.html.
95. U.S. Department of Treasury National Treatment Study 1998, http://www.treas.gov/offices/intemaional-
affairs/nts/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
96. World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Reviews, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr-e/tpr-e.
htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
VOL. 39, NO. 4
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN BANKING SERVICES 907
(operated by the External Trade Directorate of the European Commission), 9' and relevant
academic commentaries.
9 8
Table 2: Remaining Barriers in Key W'TO Members
Remaining Barriers WTO Members
Market Access
Chartering on the basis of discre- United States, Portugal, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri
tionary 'economic needs' or 'needs Lanka, Chile, India
and convenience' or 'efficiency'
test
Moratorium on new charters Brazil, Malaysia
Limitations on foreign ownership Ghana, India, Kazakhstan, Korea, Malaysia, Norway
of domestic financial institutions (subject to special authorization), Philippines, Singapore
Limitations on the number of Costa Rica, Guatemala, India, Korea, Philippines,
branches Singapore, Thailand, Pakistan
National Treatment
Limitations on the number of Singapore
ATMs
Portfolio restrictions based on Argentina, China, Korea and Turkey (list these
branch-based regulatory capital as measures as limitations on schedules), Guatemala, India,
opposed to consolidated position Chile (do not list the measures in the belief that they
are within the scope of the prudential carve-out)
Limitations on permissible activi- Vietnam (no deposits and credit cards), China (no
ties of foreign banks participation in local currency operations)
Discriminatory Tax Treatment Canada
Poor Regulatory Transparency in Angola, Republic of Korea, Ukraine
the Financial Sector
A brief note on the position in the United States is also in order. Clearly the United States
has long provided market access opportunities to foreign financial institutions on the basis of
national treatment. However, the dual regulatory nature of the banking system in the United
States continues to generate obstacles for international firms operating in the country. For
example, branching of state-chartered foreign banks is still subject to limitations in California,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Washington. The initial entry or
expansion by a foreign person through acquisition or establishment of a state-chartered
commercial bank subsidiary is prohibited or limited in twenty-eight States. 9 Furthermore,
97. Market Access Database, http://mkaccdb.eu.int/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
98. See Pierre Sauv6 & Karsten Steinfatt, Financial Services and the WTO: What Next?, in OPEN DooRs, supra
note 10.
99. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wy-
oming. World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review United States, WTrFPR/S/126 (Dec 13, 2003).
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branch licenses for foreign banks are not available in six states, 00 and representative offices
of foreign banks are not allowed in eighteen states.' 0'
VII. Assessing the Progress in Banking Services
Liberalization and Issues for the Doha Round of
Negotiations
The progress achieved so far may tell two entirely different stories depending on the
premise from which one starts. If the starting premise is a world of disrupted trade in
banking services, blatant protectionism, tight controls on international capital flows, and
few opportunities for cross-border trade, the 1997 Financial Services Agreement and sub-
sequent developments clearly marked a change for the better: the establishment of an on-
going process of multilateral negotiations resulting in legally binding commitments, subject
to quasi-judicial review; the elimination of discriminatory barriers to market access in a
large number of developed countries; the reduction of barriers in many developing and
emerging market economies; the achievement of a more or less integrated market for
wholesale services to non-consumer parties; and a broad participation of sovereign juris-
dictions which keeps expanding.
Looked at from a different perspective, the progress thus far is at best modest. In the era
of financial globalization, where cross-border trade in banking services may benefit from
the extraordinary advances in information, telecommunications, and network technology,
the GATS framework has done little to advance international trade in banking services
despite the broad participation and resources available to it. A large number of countries,
inside and outside the WTO, remain entirely uncommitted. Supplying services across bor-
ders remains largely unaffected by existing commitments whereas trade in services through
locally established entities is subject to persistent discriminatory barriers. The scope for
further improvement of legal commitments regarding types of services and modes of supply
is vast. Last, but not least, under the existing institutional design of the GATS framework,
the large pool of structural non-discriminatory barriers will never be addressed.
As always, the truth is in the middle. Inasmuch as it is obvious that the GATS process
has thus far contributed to banking services liberalization, there is huge scope for improve-
ment and a number of thorny issues to be resolved in subsequent rounds. Depending on
the VVTO Member, more services and modes of supply can still be included or financial
services commitments be scheduled for the first time. Also, existing exemptions and limi-
tations can be eliminated leading to the gradual elimination of applicable barriers to trade.
In particular, market access and national treatment commitments can be broader and
stronger. The few exemptions from MFN can be eliminated. The clarification of the def-
inition of mode one (cross-border services) and mode two (consumption abroad) in light
of electronic banking and finance is a pressing need. With regard to substantive commit-
ments, the scope and scale of mode one commitments is nowhere near the level of liber-
alization for commercial presence. In the era of electronic banking and finance, the gap has
to be bridged. The same applies for the divide between developed and developing countries,
which, however, is linked to the fate of reciprocity in the central issues of the current round,
namely agriculture and intellectual property.
100. The States are Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Oklahoma. Id.
101. Id.
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Second, the institutional framework could do with some simplification and user-
friendliness. There are seven GATS-related legal instruments and dozens of national sched-
ules that constitute the legal framework for trade in banking services. Some of them are
ambiguous (intentionally or unintentionally) and poorly drafted. A fundamental structural
weakness is the positive list approach. Simply put, we cannot make sense of the applicable
barriers to international trade unless we take the pains to examine individual legal systems.
A negative list approach whereby WTO Members undertake full commitments of market
access and national treatment and list specific exemptions and limitations makes much more
sense and improves dramatically the final product. It is also easier to negotiate and agree
from a technical point of view.
The remaining gaps between liberalization commitments and liberalization practices
could be eliminated. Arguably the function and technical definition of the prudential carve-
out must be discussed. Negotiating parties must clarify the scope of the domestic regulatory
deference. What is prudential? Is there still a requirement of transparency? Is the deference
absolute or limited by requirements of proportionality, necessity, and suitability?
Furthermore, there is currently no standstill provision, which means that current com-
mitments may theoretically be revoked. Since the 1997 Agreement, further market opening
for financial services has taken place in a number of emerging market economies, either
through unilateral action or as part of the conditionality in IMF financial assistance pro-
grams. Despite the changes, there has been no concomitant alteration in the relevant na-
tional schedules of commitments, which creates further gaps between reality and liberali-
zation commitments. The new round should address this question.
With regard to the crucial relationship between financial sector stability and financial
services liberalization, recent developments have revealed a difference in perspectives be-
tween financially developed and developing economies.102 For developed countries, there
is work to be done in many interesting areas, such as establishing meaningful regulatory
dialogue and cooperation between financial services negotiators and financial regulators
within the WTO context; strengthening the existing links between international standard-
setting bodies such as the Basel Committee, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), and the WTO to ensure consistency, mutual understanding, and
non-duplication of efforts; actively promoting a financial liberalization ethos in the domestic
regulatory agenda (e.g. enhancing regulatory transparency, participation of foreign financial
firms, selection of the least restrictive among suitable measures of regulation, supervision,
consumer protection, etc.); and, finally, in the long term, identifying areas of substantial
regulatory convergence with a view of initiating mutual recognition discussion at a broad
international level. For developing economies and financial systems, the current round of
financial services negotiations raises a slightly different set of regulatory priorities, such as
continuing to work towards the strengthening of domestic financial systems and legal in-
stitutions of regulatory and supervisory control in tandem with the reduction of regulatory
barriers.
The foregoing agenda reveals an extraordinary mix of issues and policies that could or
should have been included in the current Doha round of financial services negotiations.
102. See, e.g., Stijn Claessens & Marion Jansen, Overview- The Internationalization of Financial Services: Issues
and Lessons for Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 72; see generally Sauv6 & Steinfatt,
supra note 98; WENDY DOBSON & PIERRE JACQUET, FINANCIAL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION IN THE WTO (1998).
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Some of the items are already within the current agenda (e.g., quantitative and qualitative
improvements of national commitments). Others require a more profound revision or im-
provement of the whole process. Taken together, they set the optimal objective against
which the progress of the current Doha round could be measured.
VIII. The Doha Round and Development in Financial
Services Negotiations
One of the main strengths of the GATS is the ongoing obligation of WTO Members to
enter into successive rounds of negotiations to progressively liberalize trade in services. In
other words, the formal adoption and implementation of the GATS schedules of commit-
ments is not the end of the story. It was recognized that liberalization of trade in services
would be a long process with several rounds of negotiations.
A. THE DoHA ROUND
With regard to financial services, the post-Uruguay Round ended in December 1997
with the Financial Services Agreement. The ink in that agreement was hardly dry when a
new round of services negotiations had to begin according to the provisions of the GATS.
Indeed, the services negotiations started officially in early 2000, under the auspices of the
VTO Council for Trade in Services. Financial services were a key component of this
process from the start. In March 2001, the Services Council established the negotiating
guidelines and procedures. The work towards further progress in the institutional condi-
tions of international trade was further stimulated in November 2001 by the Declaration
of the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar that provided the political mandate
for trade negotiations on a range of subjects, including financial services. The Doha Dec-
laration endorsed the work already done with regard to services, reaffirmed the negotiating
guidelines and procedures, and established some key elements of the timetable, including
the key deadline (January 1, 2005) for the conclusion of the negotiations as part of a single
undertaking.
According to the Doha Declaration, the "negotiations on trade in services shall be con-
ducted with a view to promoting the economic growth of all trading partners and the
development of developing and least-developed countries." 03 It was envisaged by the Doha
services timetable that participants should submit initial requires for specific commitments
by June 30, 2002 and initial offers byMarch 31, 2003. The actual progress turned out to
fall short of these expectations.
Following the September 2003 Cancin Ministerial Conference, the deadlock in highly
contestable political issues relating to agricultural subsidies had a knock-on effect on ser-
vices negotiations. To heal the wounds, WTO Members in Geneva began efforts to put
the negotiations and the rest of the work program back on track. Work intensified in the
first half of 2004, with the new target date of reaching agreement on a package of framework
agreements by the end of July, in effect Friday, July 30. The first draft of the July package
was circulated on July 16, and members started negotiating intensively in various formats
103. World Trade Organization., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1,41
I.L.M. 746 (2002).
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in the fortnight beginning July 19. Final political agreement on a revised set of political
guidelines for negotiators was reached by the (then) 147 WTO members shortly after
midnight on August 1, 2004. These political commitments, also known as the July package,
were relevant for the political climate and mandate for banking services negotiations in the
following respects:
" WTO members reaffirmed the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions adopted at
Doha and their full commitments to give effect to them.
" In the light of the poor results achieved since the beginning of the services negotiations
in January 2000, WTO members endorsed the recommendations of the WTO Council
for Trade in Services that basically urged negotiators to increase their efforts towards
greater services liberalization.
" More importantly, the delays and failures of the past few years were recognized and a
new deadline was set in the hope to induce a new wave of liberalization requests, offers,
and commitments. Under the new deadline, which is currently in force, revised offers
for liberalization commitments must be tabled by May 2005. The negotiations will
conclude with the ministerial sessions to be held in Hong Kong in December 2005,
one year later than envisaged in the 2001 Doha Declaration.
B. THE KEY ISSUES
With regard to banking services, the main objectives of the current Doha agenda draw
heavily on the limitations and shortcomings of the 1997 Agreement. First, more developing
countries are expected to broaden their commitments and reach the scope and scale of
commitments made by financially developed WTO Members. Second, commitments in
mode one (cross-border services) are expected to match the level of commitments in mode
three (commercial presence). It is also expected that the scope of the prudential carve-out
will be defined although there is currently disagreement among developed countries (that
like it narrow) and developing countries (that wish it was broader). The Doha round is also
hoped to strengthen the disciplines relating to regulatory transparency and administrative
due process as a means of removing some of the structural barriers that impede international
financial activities. Finally, it is expected that WTO Members will clarify the relations
between the work in the WTO and the work in other international organizations and
standard-setting bodies involved in the international financial system, such as the Basel
Committee. In that respect, developed countries believe that the processes of financial
liberalization and soft international regulatory convergence are mutually reinforcing, but
ought to remain separate and independent, while developing countries have repeatedly
expressed their discomfort at being recipients of standards set by others and for that
reason want to link WTO commitments with greater input in the process of international
standard-setting.
C. THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED so FAR
The financial services component of the Doha round has missed several deadlines and
milestones and probably fallen short of expectations. Perhaps the most obvious conclusion
is that developed countries are encouraging more market access and national treatment
commitments, while developing countries are still refusing to open their cards before other
more pressing trade disputes were settled. The data are revealing. Despite the deadline for
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the final submission of offers by May 2005, no more than eleven WTO Members (the EU
considered as a single WTO Member) have tabled initial offers or revised offers for financial
services commitments. These are Turkey, Chile, EC, Liechtenstein, United States, Japan,
Norway, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Iceland. The following table summarizes the
extent to which the initial offer or revised offer improves on the WTO Member's com-
mitments under the 1997 Agreement. It is apparent that the most jurisdictions in this table
are close to exhausting the room for further improvements in GATS-related national treat-
ment and market access.













New Zealand (March 2003)
Summary of Offer
Existing limitations on market access remain
No commitments in modes I and 2; limitations on market
access remain
Removal of remaining restrictions in specialist sectors such as
investment management companies
Existing limitations on market access and national treatment
remain
Some limitations on market access are removed; further
commitments in mode 1 (e.g. U.S. mutual funds receiving
investment advice across borders) subject to reciprocity
Most existing limitations remain
Most existing limitations are removed
Limitations on national treatment and market access are
removed
Limitations are removed




The 1997 Financial Services Agreement was a key moment in the history of international
financial integration. Within the context of a legally binding international agreement, a
substantial number of WTO Members committed themselves to eliminate or reduce dis-
criminatory barriers to trade in banking and financial services. It was an important step
towards international financial integration despite the remaining weaknesses and gaps. A
new round of financial services negotiations was launched in January 2000 and was later
incorporated in the 2001 Doha Development Agenda. During the last few years, the pro-
gress made by financial services negotiators has been modest at best with few developed
countries being able to go much further in their liberalization commitments. From their
part, developing jurisdictions are unlikely to rush in further financial services commitments
before their remaining trade differences with developed countries, particularly in the area
of agricultural products and commodities, are settled.
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With particular regard to remaining weaknesses, it has become evident that a large num-
ber of developing and emerging market countries made no or few commitments to trade
liberalization. It also became clear that regulatory diversity in domestic prudential, monetary,
and investor protection standards has remained largely outside the scope of the normative
effects of the GATS commitments despite its collateral economic effects on international
banking operations. The specific obligations of market access and national treatment un-
dertaken by WTO members under the GATS do not address the indirect effects of regu-
latory diversity. Provided that there is no direct discrimination against foreign financial
institutions, the general provisions of the GATS-as reinforced by the explicit exemption
afforded to national prudential and investor protection measures by the Annex on Financial
Services-impose no disciplines and constraints on the exercise of regulatory rulemaking
and enforcement powers by national authorities.
On close inspection, the complete insulation of national regulatory choices from the
constraints and disciplines generated by international trade commitments reflect a rather
outdated and plainly unfounded concept of national regulatory autonomy: first, that the
elimination of direct barriers to international trade in financial services suffices to ensure
free international trade; and, second, that national regulatory autonomy in the financial
sector is so precious and inalienable that it cannot be constrained by international covenants.
It is obvious that neither perception of national regulatory choices accurately reflects the
current state of the world. Non-discriminatory regulations and practices are capable of
disturbing international financial integration. And national regulatory choices in the finan-
cial sector are influenced and shaped by all sorts of international forces, including the
process of soft regulatory convergence on the basis of international standards and codes. It
is therefore plausible to suggest that trade negotiators depart from the present position and
exploit the convergence that has been achieved by the soft harmonization activities of several
standard-setting organizations and bodies.
How would the work of international standard-setting bodies such as the Basel Com-
mittee, the IOSCO, or the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (LAIS) be
associated with international trade negotiations? Arguably it is premature to suggest a
strong form of mutual interaction and influence that would emulate the model of financial
integration in Europe. There, regulatory harmonization operates as a basis of mutual rec-
ognition of national regulatory systems that underpins the single passport in intra-community
trade in financial services. Furthermore, the European Court of Justice takes into account
the level of harmonization of the national laws in evaluating the proportionality and ne-
cessity of regulatory action against nonresident financial institutions. For various reasons,
it is very problematic to use the process of international regulatory convergence as an
instrument of trade liberalization in the WTO in a similar way (i.e., as a basis for mutual
recognition of national regimes and litigation proceedings before the Dispute Settlement
Body of the WTO).
It makes good sense, however, to establish a soft form of mutual understanding and
interaction between the WTO and national trade negotiators on the one hand and standard-
setting bodies and regulators on the other. This soft relationship could take the form of
reciprocal consultation and cooperation between officials of the two groups and regular
feedback on the possible implications of liberalization activities to regulatory activities and
vice-versa. This will perhaps enable trade negotiators, whose training and expertise do not
extend to issues of financial regulatory policy, to appreciate that national legal and regula-
tory institutions are not as divergent as they originally thought-with obvious positive
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implications for their perceptions of the benefits of open financial markets. It will also
enable the standard-setting bodies to understand the implications of common international
standards on international market openness and plan their regulatory activities according
to the expected outcome of negotiations concerning further liberalization of financial ser-
vices trade. In that respect, the joint meeting of representatives from the Basel Committee,
the IOSCO, and the IAIS, with the VWTO Committee on Trade in Financial Services in
October 2001, where the direction of the future work of the two groups of experts was
jointly discussed, sets an encouraging precedent. °4 In conclusion, the policies towards the
settlement of the antagonistic relationship between international financial openness and
national regulatory policies must reach beyond the minimum disciplines of national treat-
ment and market access, thereby taking advantage of the extraordinary progress achieved
in the structure and governance of the international financial system.
104. See Committee on Trade in Financial Services, Report of the Meeting Held on October 11, 2001, S/FIN/
M/32 (Nov. 9, 2001).
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